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DECISION ALLOWS FOR ALIENS TO BE
PENALIZED FOR EXERCISING THEIR
RIGHT TO APPEAL
Kelli Gavin*ALTHOUGH the burden of deportation is heavy and fraught with
long-term consequences, a recent Ninth Circuit decision de-
ferred to the Board of Immigration Appeal's (BIA) statutory in-
terpretation that deems any alien who is removable under the
Immigration and Nationality Act ineligible for status adjustment and ap-
plied that rule retroactively to affirm removal.' In Garfias-Rodriguez v.
Holder, the court stated that the onus of deportation was outweighed by
the extent of reliance on a previous ruling and the statutory interest in
applying the new interpretation. 2 The court dealt an additional blow by
failing to equitably stay the alien's grant of voluntary departure, citing the
Attorney General's regulation declaring that such grant automatically
terminates upon filing a petition requesting review of a BIA decision.3
Allowing an alien to voluntarily depart provides him an easier path of
future legal reentry into the United States compared with the tumultuous
journey of deportation and its associated harsh penalties. The Attorney
General's regulation, and the Ninth Circuit decision that supports it, es-
sentially punish vulnerable non-citizens who employ the fundamental
right in the American legal system to appeal an adverse decision to a
higher court.4 Although Mr. Francisco Javier Garfias-Rodriguez (Garfias)
met the stringent requirements for voluntary departure, with one stroke
of the pen the Attorney General unfairly compelled him to make an al-
most impossible decision: (1) use the benefit of voluntary departure,
thereby forfeiting the ability to have his decision reviewed and possibly
overturned, or (2) decline voluntary departure and pursue an appeal that
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2015; B.A. in History, magna cum
laude, Texas A&M University, 2010. The author would like to thank her family, friends,
and everyone at the Law Offices of Richard A. Gump, Jr. for their endless love and
support.
1. Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 528 (9th Cir. 2012).
2. Id. at 523.
3. See id. at 534-44.
4. See United States v. Arce-Hernandez, 163 F.3d 559, 563 (9th Cir. 1998).
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could still result in removal.5 Thus, Garfias was penalized for exercising a
right that should be available to any alien facing the prospect of removal
from his family, friends, and established life in the United States.
Garfias is a Mexican national who illegally entered the United States in
1996.6 In April 2002, after leaving and reentering the United States in
1999 and again in 2001, Garfias married Nancy, a U.S. citizen, and ap-
plied to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident.7 Two years later,
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service charged Garfias
with removability under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) for being "present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled," and under section
212(a)(9)(C)(i) for being an alien who was "unlawfully present in the
United States for the aggregate period of more than 1 year" and who
reentered without permission.8
At hearings before an immigration judge (IJ) in 2004, Garfias admitted
removability on both grounds but requested relief of either adjustment of
status or voluntary departure. 9 In response, the IJ accepted Garfias's rec-
ognition of his removability, deemed him "inadmissible under [ ] § 212,"
and stated that Garfias was "ineligible for adjustment [of status] under
§ 245(i)."I0 However, the IJ granted Garfias's request for voluntary de-
parture.1 Garfias appealed to the BIA, which remanded the case in 2006
based on two recent Ninth Circuit decisions allowing adjustment of inad-
missible aliens under § 212.12
On remand, Garfias's petition was again denied because his original
petition was filed after § 245(i)'s expiration date.13 Garfias appealed once
more to the BIA, but this was dismissed on account of a recent BIA deci-
sion that applied to all Ninth Circuit cases, including Garfias's case.14 The
BIA stated there was no longer any question as to Garfias's eligibility to
adjust his status and left him with two options: (1) voluntarily depart
within sixty days, or (2) file a petition for review of his appeal and auto-
matically terminate the grant of voluntary departure under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.26(i).' 5
The Ninth Circuit granted Garfias's petition for rehearing en banc to
decide if aliens who are inadmissible under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) are nev-
5. See Garfias, 702 F.3d at 534-44.
6. Id. at 507.
7. Id.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012); Garfias, 702 F.3d at 507-08.
9. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 508.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 556 (9th Cir. 2006); Perez-Gonzalez v.
Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783, 788 (9th Cir. 2004).
13. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 508.
14. Id.; see generally In re Briones, 24 1. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007).
15. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 508; see Voluntary Departure-Authority of the EOIR, 8
C.F.R. § 1240.26 (2009) ("If, prior to departing the United States, the alien files a petition
for review.. .any grant of voluntary departure shall terminate automatically upon the filing
of the petition.").
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ertheless eligible for adjustment of status under § 245(i).16 In deciding to
defer to the BIA's interpretation that removable aliens are not eligible
for adjustment, the Ninth Circuit overruled its holding in Acosta.1 Using
the five-factor test laid out in Montgomery Ward & Company v. FTC, the
court found that the BIA decision in Briones applied retroactively to
Garfias's case.18 Although one factor, the burden of retroactivity, sub-
stantially favored Garfias, making him certainly deportable, it was out-
weighed by Garfias's lack of reliance on a previous interpretation and by
the absence of a disadvantage resulting from a changed rule.19 The court
also stated that it lacked the authority to give Garfias an equitable stay of
his grant of voluntary departure because the Attorney General's regula-
tion was an appropriate use of his Congressional power to revoke said
grants.20 According to the court, the financial benefit to the government
of an alien's prompt, voluntary departure would disappear if he were per-
mitted to stay in the United States while his appeal was adjudicated. 21
In Acosta and Perez-Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit held that an alien's
inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(C) does not prohibit him from adjusting
his status under § 245(i) because the ambiguity amid the sections was not
resolved by a formal BIA decision.22 However, following the BIA's
Briones decision, the Ninth Circuit decided Gonzales v. Department of
Homeland Security23 and deferred to the BIA's resolution of the uncer-
tainty in concluding that an alien found to be inadmissible under § 212 is
not eligible for adjustment of status under § 245.24 In short, the court
overturned its own precedent and deferred to an agency opinion based on
the Supreme Court's decisions in National Cable & Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X Internet Services and Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council.25
In reaching its decision, the court applied the Montgomery Ward test,
which is used when a "new administrative policy is announced and imple-
mented through adjudication." 2 6 The court stated this test was appropri-
ate because it was overturning precedent as a result of "a contrary
statutory interpretation by an agency."27 The court chose the Montgom-
ery Ward test over the test applied in Chevron Oil Company v. Huson,
16. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 513-14.
17. Id. at 514.
18. Id. at 517-20; see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir.
1982); see generally Briones, 241 I. & N. Dec. 355.
19. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 514-23. The BIA's decision merely clarified the law, rather
than changed it outright. Id.
20. Id. at 524-28.
21. Id. at 528.
22. Id. at 509-11; see Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 556 (9th Cir. 2006); see Perez-
Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783, 792-95 (9th Cir. 2004).
23. See Gonzales v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007).
24. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 511.
25. Id.; see Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
26. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 518.
27. Id. at 520.
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which addresses when a rule changed by a court should be applied retro-
actively, since the court itself was not announcing a new rule of law.2 8 The
court stated that it was simply "approving and applying a new rule that
the BIA announced," rather than offering a perspective on the correct-
ness of a prior rule or being corrected by a higher court. 29 In addition, the
court disregarded the first factor and focused on the other Montgomery
Ward factors of:
[W]hether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well
established practice or merely attempts to fill a void[;] . . . the extent
to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the
former rule[;] ... the degree of the burden which a retroactive order
imposes on party[;] and . . . the statutory interest in applying a new
rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard.30
The fourth factor of the Montgomery Ward test-degree of burden-
strongly favored Garfias. 3 ' And, even though the court had stated on
more than one occasion that "'deportation alone is a substantial burden
that weighs against retroactive application of an agency adjudication,"' it
nevertheless determined that the rule announced in Briones should apply
retroactively to Garfias.32 The court stated that Garfias's reliance interest
was insufficient, and that his case was not one where the agency diverged
from a previously stated standard of conduct.33
After concluding that the rule applied to Garfias retroactively and he
was therefore deportable, the court stated that it was within the Attorney
General's power to take away a grant of voluntary departure.34 In
§ 1229c, Congress granted the Attorney General the authority to control
grants of voluntary departure.35 The Ninth Circuit noted that the regula-
tion exemplified the Attorney General's power "to prohibit and thereby
terminate voluntary departure" and his "authority to limit eligibility"
under the statute.36
The Ninth Circuit found that an alien is not penalized for exercising his
fundamental right to appeal an adverse decision because he is still af-
forded the opportunity to depart thirty days after filing the appeal and to
work on his case outside the country.37 The only penalty the court linked
to the regulation was the financial harm to the government when an alien
overstayed the thirty-day period, remained in the United States illegally,
and made the government fund the appeal.38 However, in his dissent,
28. Id. at 517-18; see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
29. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 517.
30. Id. at 518.
31. Id. at 523.
32. Id. at 520-23 (quoting Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 952 (9th Cir.
2007)).
33. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 520-23.
34. Id. at 527.
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012).
36. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 527.
37. Id. at 528.
38. Id.
206 [Vol. 67
01 Al Immigration Law-Ninth Circuit Decision 207
Judge Reinhardt argued that the choices presented to a non-citizen-
someone who is at a presumptive disadvantage in the American court
system-are not fair for anyone to have to make.39
Perhaps the Ninth Circuit's most significant mistake was not acknowl-
edging that the Attorney General's regulation exceeded his congressio-
nally granted power to limit and prohibit eligibility for voluntary
departure.40 The court's decision discourages aliens from contributing to
America's infrastructures and economy by forcing them to decide be-
tween using their basic privilege of judicial process or returning to their
home countries to face possible lack of support, torture, imprisonment,
and other dangers.41 As the court pointed out, there is a loss of benefit to
the government when it must finance the adjudication of an alien's ap-
peal.4 2 However, that cost may potentially be recovered if an alien was
permitted to voluntarily depart after an appeal and legally reenter the
United States at a later date to become a participating member of Ameri-
can society. Also, if an alien chooses to appeal but departs within the
thirty-day grace period, there is no guarantee that he will be able to suc-
cessfully prepare his appeal or give effective assistance to his counsel in
the United States.43
To encourage more nonimmigrants to become legal permanent re-
sidents and those residents to become naturalized U.S. citizens, the De-
partment of Homeland Security decreased the wait time for certain
groups of immigrants to file petitions.44 Recent articles show that a signif-
icant portion of the permanent resident population is eligible for citizen-
ship, but choose not to act on that opportunity.45 These missed
opportunities result in harm to our economy, as there is evidence that a
legal permanent resident is less likely than a citizen to buy a home, invest,
take part in community activities, or pursue other economic endeavors.46
The specter of removal is monumental in an alien's life, and the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged the decision's magnitude by repeatedly
"[r]ecognizing . . . that non-citizens in removal hearings are entitled to
39. Id. at 534-37 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 534.
41. See id.; Mariela Olivares, Renewing the Dream: Dream Act Redux and Immigration
Reform, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 79, 120 (2013) ("One recent study analyzing the effects
of immigration on the U. . economy concluded that immigrants 'expand the U.S. econ-
omy's productive capacity, stimulate investment, and promote specialization that in the
long run boosts productivity."').
42. See Garfias, 702 F.3d at 535.
43. Id. at 536-37.
44. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN FOR OCTOBER 2013, VOL. IX, No. 61,
(Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://travel.state.gov/visalbulletin/bulletin_6062.html.
45. See Ann Garcia, The Facts on Immigration Today, CTR. FOR Am. PROGRESS (Aug.
14, 2013), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2013/04/03/59040/
the-facts-on-immigration-today-3/.
46. See Manuel Pastor & Justin Scoggins, Citizen Gain: The Economic Benefits of Nat-
uralization for Immigrants and the Economy, CTR. FOR STUDY IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
(Dec. 2012), http://csii.usc.edu/documents/citizen-gain-.web.pdf.
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due process protections under the Fifth Amendment." 47 However, in this
case, the court had no a problem with the fact that the regulation takes
away this right from aliens. An alien's life can be permanently impacted
by the different benefits and consequences associated with being de-
ported versus voluntarily departing. 48 While voluntary departure allows
an alien time to take care of his obligations and relationships before leav-
ing, removal does not give him this same opportunity.49 Moreover, while
voluntarily departure does not subject an alien to a time ban prohibiting
him from legally reentering the United States at a later date, deportation
can subject him to a ten-year ban, a lifelong ban, or even criminal prose-
cution for reentering.50
There are two distinct types of voluntary departure: "pre-decisional"
and "post-decisional." 51 An alien requesting pre-decisional voluntary de-
parture does not have to meet any specific qualifications, other than
agreeing not to file for another type of relief.5 2 To be eligible for post-
decisional departure, an alien must meet the strict standard of having one
or more years of presence in the United States, a five-year history of
good moral character, no record of committing certain criminal or other
offenses, and the intent and financial means to depart the United
States.53 Post-decisional voluntary departure also requires an alien to de-
part in less time than a pre-decisional grant, and the grantees must post a
bond to cover their deportation costs. 5 4
The Ninth Circuit ignored a key difference between these two types of
voluntary departure that existed prior to the regulation. Pre-decisional
departure necessarily involves giving up the right to appeal or seek other
relief, but those procedural rights are still guaranteed if an alien qualifies
for the loftier post-decisional voluntary departure.55 Additionally, the
higher standard for obtaining a post-decisional grant provides insight into
an alien's character and shows the government that, perhaps, this person
should not be deported. At least, the United States should want all aliens
to have an equitable judicial experience to encourage them to return to
America to invest time, money, and skills. 5 6 The choice faced by aliens
places them at a disadvantage compared with other non-citizens.57
There are no cases supporting the Ninth Circuit's position that the At-
torney General has the power to automatically terminate a grant of vol-
47. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 534; see Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir.
1999).
48. See Garfias, 702 F.3d at 536.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012); Garfias, 702 F.3d at 537-38.
52. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012); Garfias, 702 F.3d at 537-38; In re Arguelles-Campos,
22 I. & N. Dec. 811, 814-16 (BIA 1999).
53. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 538.
54. Id. at 537-38.
55. See id.; El Himri v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1261, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2003).
56. See Garfias, 702 F.3d at 536.
57. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012).
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untary departure, nor is there any evidence of legislative intent that the
statute deprive an alien of his procedural rights.58 Elimination of a non-
citizen's procedural rights seems to remove the vital difference between
the separate types and disregards the purpose behind having two distinct
categories in the first place. The regulation's effect could be equated to
requiring pre-decisional applicants to meet the higher standard for post-
decisional voluntary departure. In fact, the BIA itself specifically ac-
knowledged that a key difference between the two types of voluntary de-
parture is the loss of procedural rights in one but not the other.59
The court also maintained that the Attorney General has the power to
take away a grant of voluntary departure at any moment after it is
granted, perhaps even up until the time the alien has actually departed
the country. 60 The court ran into statutory issues when it stated that the
ability to limit a class means that you can require someone to meet a
future condition, which is not permissible. Requiring an alien to sustain
his eligibility into the future and taking away his grant at any point up
until he departs the country would be like disallowing someone from vot-
ing or serving on a jury because there is a possibility they will commit a
crime in the future. Additionally, there is nothing in the statute or the
Attorney General's regulation stating that a breach of any of the other
post-decisional requirements results in automatic termination of a
grant.61 The Attorney General does have the ability to revoke a grant of
voluntary departure, but can only do so if it should never have been
granted in the first place, another example of a present tense time frame
rather than a future one.6 2
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit tried to turn the granting of voluntary depar-
ture into a two-step process that always requires approval by the Attor-
ney General, when the statute mentions nothing about this.63 Both the IJ
and BIA have the power to act as surrogates of the Attorney General to
grant the orders in the first place." The court's decision also ignores that
the Attorney General essentially created a new kind of departure by giv-
ing the alien thirty days to voluntarily depart without penalty after filing
his petition for review.65 The Attorney General has never been given the
authority to create departure standards. 66
A more equitable and judicially acceptable outcome could have re-
sulted if the court decided that, while an inadmissible alien is not eligible
to adjust, the rule should not have retroactively applied to Garfias under
the Chevron test. More importantly, the court should have concluded that
58. Garfias, 702 F.3d at 537.
59. Id. at 538-39.
60. Id. at 539-40.
61. Id. at 540.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 541-42 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
64. Id.




the Attorney General's regulation exceeded his powers because it is un-
just for a grant of voluntary departure to terminate upon filing an appeal.
Such a decision would allow those who qualify for voluntary departure to
retain that benefit and still be able to exercise their right to appeal
granted by virtue of their participation in the American legal system, en-
courage aliens to immigrate legally to the United States, and establish the
Ninth Circuit's agreement with the BIA's interpretation of the ambiguous
sections.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Garfias will have a detrimental effect on
aliens who wish not only to exercise the fundamental right of judicial re-
view, but also desire to depart the country voluntarily so as to avoid the
harsh repercussions associated with deportation.67 The potentially endur-
ing influence a removal proceeding can have on an alien's life should
have alerted the court to the fact that the Attorney General's regulation
was not a reasonable interpretation of the statute and went far beyond his
granted power. The penalty that is inflicted on these aliens could drasti-
cally diminish our ability to enhance the American economy through job
competition, investment, and integration of these non-citizens into our
communities.
67. See id. at 534-44 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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